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Introduction

The new Mexican Competition Act, officially called the FederalLaw of Economic Competition (hereinafter "FLEC"), was published in the Official Gazette
*

Jalife & Caballero Abogados, Mexico City. http://jcip.mx/
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of the Federation (hereinafter "OGF") on May 23, 2014.1 This new law introduces several new features to update the competition law institutions, but
above all it is the development of the constitutional amendment on competition
and telecommunications published in the OGF on June 11, 2013 (hereinafter "the
constitutional amendment"). Thus, this new law is also part of a complex political process committed to a series of profound reforms 2 aimed not only to initiate
the potential of the Mexican economy but also to notably improve the legal system as a whole.
The constitutional amendment is perhaps the most significant constitutional
change concerning competition and telecommunications affairs during the life of
our Constitution (enacted and in force since 1917). Hence, although enacted together, the constitutional amendment has two parts: (i) one part devoted to competition law institutions, and (ii) a second part devoted specifically to regulation
on telecommunications and broadcasting. 3 Of course, the second part deserves a
specific essay by itself, but this article will not focus on that part. It will focus
only on the competition law part.
The constitutional amendment has been questioned because of the excessive
volume of rules introduced into the Constitutional text,4 as the rules could have
been introduced into secondary legislation. However, the explanation is legal and
political: a rule introduced into the Constitution eliminates the risk of being challenged before the courts alleging that the rule is unconstitutional, facilitating the
enforcement of the antitrust law by the agencies and reducing the volume of
litigation.
Article 28 of the Constitution was the most affected provision.5 That provision
was extended in a surprising way mainly due to the text devoted to regulating the
new federal competition agencies: the Federal Economic Competition Commission (hereinafter "FECC") and the Federal Telecommunications Institute (hereinafter "FTI"). 6 Both of them, as federal autonomous agencies of the United
Mexican States, are not part of the Administration under the President of the
Republic. 7 More importantly, the extended article 28 of the Constitution also
includes new competition law institutions as "barriers to competition," an adapta-

I In force since July 7 2014.
2 Since December 2012, i.e. the beginning of the presidency of Enrique Pefia Nieto, the Federal
Congress has approved the reform on competition and telecommunications, the energetic reform, the
financial reform, the educative reform, the tax reform and the political reform. For instance, as result of
that, we have 5 new federal autonomous agencies and enforcers.
3 It includes for instance: regulation on interconnection services, the "must carry" and "must offer"
obligations in open and restricted TV, the "market power" declaration (i.e. dominance declaration) and
the new institution called "preponderance" declaration and its associated asymmetric regulation, licenses
and permits to use radio spectrum, and other issues specific to the regulation of telecommunications and
broadcasting.
4 For instance, the whole text of the competition and telecommunications reform is longer than the
American Constitution.
5 Constituci6n Polftica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, Article 28, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
6 Id

7 Id.
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tion of the "essential facilities" doctrine, and a new design of legal proceeding

before the FECC.8
In essence, the aims of the constitutional amendment were: (i) to update the
competition law institutions as a mean to improve the efficiency and detonate the
innovation in the Mexican economy, (ii) to improve the enforcement of competition law in favor of public interest (especially in telecommunications and broadcasting sectors) by creating two new enforcement agencies and (iii) to accelerate
the enforcement of the remedies imposed by the agencies by reducing the litigations against its decisions.
The "Expanded" Purpose of the FLEC

II.

The new FLEC purpose declaration 9 is: "promote, protect and ensure free concurrence and economic competition, as well as prevent, investigate, combat, effectively chase, severely punish and eliminate monopolies, monopolistic
practices, unlawful mergers, barriers to free competition, and other restrictions on
the efficient functioning of markets."
A first point to note is the conceptual precision. The former Competition Law
spoke of free competition, but now the FLEC establishes along itself the terms:
free concurrence and economic competition, which is a more logical and accurate
sequence.1 0 Indeed, first, a firm tries to enter the market (market access, concurrence) and once the firm has entered, one can speak of economic competition and
displacement practices.
III.
A.

The New Competition Authority: The FECC and the IFT
Legal Status and Structure

There is an inclination of lawmakers in Mexico to what we may call "Mexican
fever of creating autonomous agencies." This "fever" is based on the idea that
this so-called solution remedies public policy problems and ensures a better law
enforcement (despite being only an institutional design shift)." The autonomous
agencies are part of the Mexican State at federal level but they are not part of the
Administration under the President.1 2 The autonomy can only be established by
the Constitution.' 3
The former Federal Competition Commission was an agency under the structure of the Ministry of Economy, which is part of the Administration under the
4
President (as well as the former Federal Telecommunications Commission).'
8 Id.
9 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 2, Diario Oficial
de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
10 Id.

11

XAVIER GINEBRA SERRA1BOU & VIcrOR MANUEL CASTRILLON, La Nueva Ley Federal de Com-

petencia Econ6mica 45 (2014).
12 Id.
13 Id.

14 Former Telecommunications Law (1995), section 1.
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Now the FECC and the FIT, both with powers to enforce competition law (referred jointly as "competition authority"), are autonomous agencies only subjected to the Constitution, the Laws, and the Federal Courts' judicial control.' 5
This also means that the handling of competition policy in Mexico is not the
responsibility of the President of the Republic or the agencies under him; it is
responsibility of the two new agencies: the FECC and the FTI.1 6
The FT1 has the power to enforce the FLEC only in telecommunications and
broadcasting sectors and markets, so the procedural and substantive issues referred to here are completely applicable to its enforcement activities.' 7 If there
were a conflict between the FECC and FTI on competence to hear a case, a
Federal Collegiate Court of Circuit specializing in Competition and Telecommunications will ultimately resolve the conflict. 18
The following bodies comprise the institutional design of the new FECC:'9 :
1. The Plenum
2. The Investigation Authority
3. Internal Comptroller
Herein we provide description of said bodies.
The Plenum 20

1.

The plenum is the decision-making body of the FECC. 2 1 Its makeup consists
of seven Commissioners supposedly extremely trained in the application of competition law. 2 2 The FLEC clarifies various Plenum operating issues and obligations of Commissioners. 23 That is very important because under the life of the
previous law these issues were interpreted by the Commissioners and other officials and therefore generated controversial decisions and doubtful transparency
practices. 24
Regarding the Plenum decisions, all Commissioners must vote, so that no
Commissioner may abstain from voting; the decisions are taken by majority un15 Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, Article 28, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
16 Id.
17 Id.

18 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 5, Diario Oficial
de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
19 A parallel structure is designed within the FTi,
20 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 18 - 21, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
21 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 3-XIII, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
22 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 10, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
23 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 18 - 21, 51,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
24 Ref. Original decision ruled an administrative liability of Telcel case (Commission vs Telcel
2011).
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.

less the specific assumptions stated in article 18 of the FLEC;2 5 if a Commissioner is not present during the session, he must issue his vote in writing. 26 It is
very positive for transparency purposes the provision in FLEC regarding the publicity of the Plenum sessions and its decisions (except those parts containing confidential information). 27 The Plenum also has to issue a stenographic version of
its meetings. 2 8
The objection to the Commissioners cannot be granted on the basis of an expression of a technical review, public explanation of the rationale of a decision,
or issuing a separate opinion to the decision. 29 The causes of impediment for
hearing a case (for a Commissioner) are grounded on the basis of the existence of
a direct or indirect interest on the case 30
Another novel aspect of Plenum regulation is the so-called "interview" between commissioners and economic agents' representatives. In fact, these "interviews" are legal, ex parte meetings (parallels to the official hearings of the
proceeding). 3 1 Although totally unregulated, these ex parte meetings had been
performing since 1993.32
Unlike American legal practice, ex parte meetings in Mexico are not completely frowned upon in legal proceedings, whether before Courts or administrative agencies. 3 3 Because the characteristic of the proceeding before the former
Federal Competition Commission was not of an adversarial one but of an inquisitorial one, 3 4
25 According to article 18 of the FLEC, such assumptions are meant to be measures to determine the
existence of "barriers to competition" and essential inputs, the decisions on divestiture, as well as the
approval of regulatory provisions, shall be taken at least by 5 Commissioners.
26 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 18, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
27

Id.

28 Id.

29 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 30 - 33, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
30 According to Article 24 of the FLEC, by direct or indirect interest it shall be understood: (i) The
Commissioner has family relationship with one of the interested parties or their representatives; (ii) The
Commissioner has interest (personal, family or business) in the case, including those that may be of some
benefit for himself, his spouse or relatives; (iii) The Commissioner, his spouse or any of his relatives are
heir, legatee, donee or guarantor of any of the interested parties or their representatives; (iv) The Commissioner has been witness or expert witness, attorney or representative in the case in question, or has
previously managed the case in favor or against any of the interested parties, and (v) The Commissioner
has publicly and unequivocally set the direction of his vote before the Plenum decides the case.
31 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 83, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
32 The authors conclude said statement from personal observations during their own performances at
the former Competition Commission during said period of time
33 This statement does not necessarily include the legal practice in commercial arbitration.

.

34 By inquisitorial we understand a legal proceeding where the Court or Agency or a part of it is
actively involved in investigating the facts of the case, as opposed to an adversarial proceeding where the
role of the Court/Agency is primarily that of an impartial referee between the prosecution and the defense. The new proceeding before the FECC is closer to an adversarial one it was thought the regulation
of ex parte meetings was completely unnecessary
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In a proceeding more similar to an adversarial one, there are clearly identified
parties (the Investigation Authority and the respondent), so that the figure of ex
parte meeting is fully applicable. However, the legalization of the ex parte meetings leaves out the rights of: (i) the petitioners because they are not recognized as
a party in the proceeding but as an assistant of the Investigation Authority, and
(ii) the consumers not officially recognized as a party in the proceeding.3 5
Neither of them will be represented during the ex parte meetings.
Hence, the FLEC provides that to the legalized ex parte meetings called "interviews," all Commissioners must be summoned. 36 However, the "interviews" can
be held with the presence of orily one of them. 3 7 The FECC must form a record at
least containing the place, date, start time and end time of the interview, as well
as the full names of all persons who were present for the interview and the issues
covered during it.38
The Investigation Authority (hereinafter "IA ")39

2.

Since investigation and the decision-making functions are completely separated in the FLEC, the IA is the FECC's body responsible for conducting the
investigations (a "public antitrust prosecutor") acting as a party to the proceeding. 40 1n exercising its powers, the IA is endowed with technical and managerial
autonomy to decide on its operation and decisions. 4 1
The head of the IA is appointed and removed by the Plenum, by a majority of
5 commissioners (4 years in office and can be re-elected). 4 2 According to the
FLEC, 43 the head of the IA should be "independent in his decisions and performance, professional and impartial in his actions", and is subjected to legal principles of lawfulness, objectivity, honesty, exhaustiveness and transparency, as well
as to the "contact rules.""4
It is problematic that the FLEC requires "impartiality" to the head of the IA,
given that the IA is officially a party to the proceeding as the complainant. The
requirement of impartiality for the Plenum can be understood, because it is the
35 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 83, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 This information should be published on the website of the CFCE. Article 25.
39 Ley
Oficial de
40 Ley
Oficial de
41 Ley
Oficial de
42 Ley
Oficial de
43 Ley
Oficial de
44 Ley
Oficial de
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Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 26 - 36,
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 26 - 27,
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 26 - 29,
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 30 - 33,
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 26,
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).

Diario
Diario
Diario
Diario
Diario

Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 34 - 35, Diario
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
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decision-making body of the FECC, but the requirement is not logical for the IA.
The role of the IA should be clearly partial since its function is to file a formal
accusation against the respondent grounded in the gathered evidence. It is assumed that the head of the IA represents a public-interest position because the
whole society is interested in the existence of markets where competition conditions exist. Thus, it is not appropriate to require impartiality to the complainant
inasmuch as its logical behavior is to argue in favor of its own interests (publicinterest in the case of IA).
3.

Internal Comptroller4 5

The Internal Comptroller is a body of supervision and administrative control
headed by a chief appointed by the Chamber of Representatives. 4 6 The chief is
appointed to terms of 4 years in office and can be reelected. 47 The functions of
this body are: (i) the control of income and expenditure of the FECC and (ii) the
enforcement of the regulations on administrative liability of public officials. 48
These functions are not relevant regarding the substantive application of competition law. Therefore, the Internal Comptroller is not discussed in detail in this
Article.
B.

Powers 49

Beyond its classics powers of prosecuting and sanctioning monopolistic practices and the powers related to control of mergers, the powers of the FLEC that
should be highlighted for its relevance and novelty are:
* Regarding "barriers to competition" and essential inputs 5 0 : (i) order the nec-

essary measures aimed to eliminate "barriers to concurrence and free competition" and (ii) determine the existence and regulate access to essential
inputs such as divestiture of assets, shares, rights or company parts in the
necessary proportions to eliminate anticompetitive effects.
* "Formal-opinion" and "General Guidance" on competition affairs 5 1 : (i) resolve a specific issue placed under its consideration through the "Formalopinion requests" and (ii) provide "General guidance" on competition law
affairs as requested by any person.
45 Ley
Oficial de
46 Ley
Oficial de
47 Id.
48 Ley
Oficial de
49 Ley
Oficial de
50 Ley
Oficial de
51 Ley
Oficial de

Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 37 - 46, Diario
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 37 - 40, Diario
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 37,
Ia Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 12,
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 12-II,
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 12-XVI,
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
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* Regulatory provisions 52: issue and publish (after public consultation) regulatory provisions on: (a) Imposition of sanctions, (b) Monopolistic practices,
(c) Market power determination (dominance), (d) Relevant market determination, (e) Barriers to competition, (f) Essential inputs and (g) Measures on
divestiture of assets, shares, rights or company parts.
* Directives. Guidelines, and Technical Criteri 5 3 : issue and publish (after
public consultation) soft-law provisions on: (a) Mergers, (b) Investigations,
(c) Commitment decisions (settlement agreements), Leniency program and
reduction of fines; (d) Suspension of acts constituting probable monopolistic
practices or unlawful mergers, (e) Bail to suspend the application of interim
and precautionary measures, (f) Requests for dismissal of criminal proceedings in cases referred by the Federal Criminal Code, and (g) The ones necessary for the effective competition law enforcement.
* Class actionS 54 : according to the Federal Civil Procedures Code, the FECC
has standing to file class actions before Federal Courts in order to claim
antitrust damages as class representative.
IV.

Anti-Competitive Practices
Absolute Monopolistic Practices (Horizontal Restraints)

A.

Since the former 1993 competition Law was passed, the cartels or horizontal
restraints to competition have received in Mexico the name of "absolute monopolistic practices" (AMPs). 55 Parties are not permitted to plead the efficiency defense against allegations raised under the law, so they are illegal per se. 5 6 The
AMPs are: (i) price fixing and exchange of information with the purpose or effect
of price fixing, (ii) supply manipulation, (iii) market allocation/segmentation and
57
(iv) bid rigging between competitors.
The new FLEC makes a shift regarding the exchange of information between
competitors. The FLEC establishes as an autonomous AMP "the exchange of
information with any of the purposes or effects" 58 referred to above, such as price
fixing, supply manipulation, market allocation and bid rigging. 59 Thus, the scope
and consequences of the exchange of information between competitors are broad52 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 12-XVII, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
53 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 12-XXII, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
54 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 12-XXVIII,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
55 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 8 - 10, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
56 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 53, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
57 Id.

58 Ley
Oficial de
59 Ley
Oficial de
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Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 53-V, Diario
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 53, Diario
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
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ened. So, economic agents exploring mergers should be careful not to incur this
new AMP during the negotiations of their operations.
B.

Relative Monopolistic Practices (Vertical Restraints)

Vertical restraints to competition, or abuses of dominance, are known in Mexico as relative monopolistic practices (RMPs). 6 0 They are not illegal per se since
it is possible to plead the efficiency defense. 6 1 Although the new FLEC preserves
the fundamental system on RMPs of the former Law, the following changes are
worthy to be highlighted.

1.

Related Markets

What had been only a logical deduction of the analysis under the force of the
former Law now is explicitly recognized by the FLEC.62 The market power
should be held over the relevant market in which the RMPs take place, and not in
any other market (even though there can be any inferred relationship given by
any similarity, i.e. product similarity).
However, unlike the former Law, it is now clearly recognized that the RMPs
may affect not only the relevant market but also related markets.6' This effect is
seen in unlawful displacements of competitors, impairment of market access or
establishment of exclusive advantages favoring only some economic agents. 64
Due to Mexico's very formalistic legal tradition and strict application of the
written law, this explicit recognition of related markets is very important. As the
former Law did not explicitly refer to related markets as potentially affected by
anti-competitive behavior, the decisions of the former Federal Competition Commission referring to those effects were criticized due to lack of legal certainty. 65
2.

Efficiency Gains

Grounded in the economic rationale, a vertical restraint to competition is acceptable if the resulting efficiency gains outweigh its anticompetitive effects. According to the new FLEC6 6 , the efficiency gains must: (i) favorably affect
60 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 56, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
61 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 55, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
62 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 54, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
63 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 55, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
6 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 54, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
65 The only reference to related markets was established in Article 16 of the former law but it was
only applicable to mergers and acquisitions. Art 16 of former Competition Law.
66 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 55, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
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competition process, (ii) clearly outweigh the anticompetitive effects, and (iii)
lead to an improvement of consumer welfare.
Additionally, the former Law required the efficiency gains should not result
in: (i) a significant increase in the price, (ii) a significant reduction in the available choices to consumers, or (iii) an important deterrence of innovation in the
relevant market. 67 However, these three clear and specific controls over the efficiency gains are now excluded from the FLEC. 68
One might think such exclusion is not significant as the above controls should
be included within the concept "improvement of consumer welfare." 69 Nevertheless, a wider interpretation allows the practitioners to allege the existence of an
improvement of consumer welfare despite evident and significant: (i) price increases, (ii) reduction of choices to consumers or (iii) innovation deterrence. 70
So, the changes on the efficiency gains standard are likely to favor the interests
of the economic agents rather than the public interest.
3.

Changes in the Description of RMPs
'

Tying 7

67 Ley
Oficial de
68 Ley
Oficial de
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Ley
Oficial de
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Federal de Competencia Econdmica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 11 - 13, Diario
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
Federal de Competencia Econdmica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 53, Diario
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).

Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 56-III, Diario
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
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Predatorypricing72

The consequence of such change is that selling below average total cost shall
be predatory. Probably, the change might facilitate the investigation of the prosecutor but also might inhibit discounts to consumers; the words "systematic" and
"occasional" were not only ornaments on the former Law but were part of a wellaccepted standard. 73
Discriminatory treatment7 4

Such change is positive, and its adoption into Law was probably encouraged
due to Radiomovil Dipsa (Telcel-America Movil)-Interconnection Service for
call termination on mobile phones (DE-037-2006). While a Telcel user produced
72 Ley
Oficial de
73 Id.
74 Ley
Oficial de

Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 56-VII, Diario
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 56-X, Diario
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
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his call on-net and paid a rate x, a mobile operator (competitor) produced the call
off-net and paid a rate x+1 (with the repercussions on the rates to competitors
users).7 5 So, it was clearly convenient being a Telcel user if most of the calls
were ended on-net. The former FederalCompetition Commission held that Telcel

was charging different rates to buyers situated in the same conditions.7 6
Indeed, this case involved what in other jurisdictions is known as margin
squeeze.7 7 Inasmuch as the rate charged to a competing operator (x+1) is higher
than the rate charged to an internal user, the competing operator cannot match the
final rate charged by Telcel to its users.7 8 Notwithstanding, as the margin squeeze
practice was not provided in the former law, the former Federal Competition
Commission had to frame the conduct of Telcel as a discriminatory treatment.
Telcel, inter alia, held that: (i) Telcel users and mobile operators requesting
interconnection were not in equal circumstances and (ii) it was natural that Telcel
users paid better rates than competing operators, precisely because their conditions were different. 7 9 Certainly the change on the wording "equivalent conditions" by the FLEC, expands the scope of the legal hypothesis and allows a
broader legal interpretation in favor of the prosecutor.
Increasing costs to rivals / impeding production process to rivals / reducing
demand to rivalsso

The economic rationale of the rewording is to anticipate the conduct of firms
preventing the entry of new firms, and by doing so, eliminating potential competition. The new firms that are not yet participating in the market cannot yet be
75 Id.
76

Id.

77 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 56-XIII, Diario

Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
78 Id.
79 This is one of the problems to which is addressed the asymmetric regulation over "preponderant"
economic agents in telecommunications and broadcasting sector. This asymmetric regulation is grounded
in the constitutional amendment, the new Federal Law of Telecommunications and Broadcasting (published in the OGF the July 14, 2014) and the regulatory decisions of the FIT against America Movil and
Grupo Televisa, both of them issued on May, 2014.
80 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 56-XI, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
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considered as "competitors" or "rivals," but they can be obviously considered as
"other economic agents." 8
Under the force of the former Law, it was required the conduct was directed
against competitors. However, the rewording ("other economic agents") also
matches with the recognition of related markets (and its participants) as potentially affected by a RMP. So, not only rivals in the relevant market might be
affected, but also economic agents participating in related markets.
C.

New RMPs: The Essential Input and the Margin Squeeze 82

Perhaps one of the most important things in the new FLEC is the incorporation
of two new RMPs.
On essential input, the FLEC provides that "denial, access restriction or access
on discriminatory terms and conditions to an essential input by one or more economic agents" is a RMP.83 Of course, the essential input institution has its origin
in the essential facilities doctrine. 84
Regarding the margin squeeze, the FLEC defines it as: "reducing the margin
between the access price to an essential input supplied by one or more economic
agents and the price of the good or service supplied to the final consumer by the
same economic agents using to its production the essential input." 8 5
As provided above, the lawmaker produced this legal wording of margin
squeeze from the facts of the Telcel case. However, the wording, as approved,
involves a mix between a refusal to deal and the essential input. The refusal to
deal or the discriminatory treatment was already covered by the former Law, and
in our view, the change in its wording ("equivalent conditions" instead of "equality of conditions") could have solved the interpretation problem raised in Telcel.
The mix between refusal to deal and essential input will become a very complex issue to handle for both the IA and the firms.
V.

"Barriers to Competition," Essential Inputs and Regulatory Remedies

A.

"Barriers to Competition" 86

The FLEC orders the competition authority to assure "the prevention and removal of barriers to free concurrence and economic competition in the necessary
81 Id.
82 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 56-XII, XIII,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
83 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 56 Fraction XIII,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
84 See Genebra-Serrabou and Castrillon, supra note II at 65 - 66.
85 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 56 Fraction XI,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
86 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 57, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
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proportions to eliminate its anticompetitive effects." 87 This new concept in the
Mexican law, as far as we are concerned, is unparalleled in the international
antitrust practice. At least not as a legal institution as defined by the FLEC: "any
structural feature of the market, that is: fact or action of the economic agents with
the purpose or effect of: (i) preventing access of competitors or limiting their
ability to compete in markets, (ii) preventing or distorting the process of free
competition, (iii) as well as the enactment of legal provisions issued by any level
of government that unduly impede or distort the process of free competition. 8 8
This new legal institution is highly questionable and its careless application
would be dangerous. First, a "structural feature of the market" is an abstraction
by itself, not a conduct. A purpose is pursued by a subject, and a cause or effect
is also pursued by a subject. A purpose is not pursued by an abstraction.
What is a "structural feature of the market"? It basically has to do with 3 things:
(i) number of players on the market and their market share, (ii) degree of differentiation of the good or service, and (iii) the existence of barriers to entry and
exit.8 9 In this way, we speak of monopoly, oligopoly, monopolistic competition,
monopsony and so on. However, these structures are not always a result of the
behavior of firms or the regulatory framework.
There are markets that hold only one or few players, either by large investments needed, scarcity of inputs (e.g. radio spectrum), the minimum efficient
scale to be profitable (e.g. refineries) or because of natural monopolies (operation
of an airport or a highway). 9 0 Moreover, there is already sectorial regulation focused precisely to the concern of lack of competition in certain markets due to
structural features (ports, airports, telecommunications, and so on). 9 1
Second, defining the "barriers to competition" as any fact or action of economic agents, without describing precisely what is the unlawful conduct, makes
this institution likely to be unconstitutional. This construction is most likely contrary to legal certainty, an important feature and requirement in our formalistic
legal system.
Perhaps, the only positive aspect of this institution is that it alludes to public
regulation as a barrier to competition (attributable to the government). 9 2 At least
in Mexico, many markets with problems on competition may be explained due to
an erroneous design of regulation, such as telecommunications, which is ex93
pected to improve its functioning due to new regulation.
87 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Fraction IV, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
88 Id.
89 Luque de la Torre Marfa de los Angeles, et al. Curso Prdcticos de Economfa de la Empresa, un
Enfoque de Organizaci6n. Editorial Pirimide, Madrid, 2001.Parte V, Capitulos 17 y 20.
90 Id.

91 For instance, Mexican Telecommunications Law.
92 Comision Federal de la Competencia (1997), In-Depth Examination of Competition Policy in
Mexico (1995-96), submitted to OECD Competition Law and Policy Committee, 21 January 1997.
93 Id.
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B.

Essential Input 9 4

As provided above, the essential input has its origin in the essential facility
doctrine. Rather than a monopolistic practice by itself, the essential facility doctrine has been used, in the United States and in Europe, as a special or exceptional circumstance in determining the relevant market and market power.9 5
Thus, it can be used as a refusal to deal or as a discriminatory treatment by
denying access to the facility previously determined as essential. 96 Thus, essential facility/essential input is a circumstantial element rather than a behavioral
one.
From the perspective of the civil law tradition, the essential facility doctrine
means that an imposition to negotiate contracts is pursued to compensate a weak
competitive market structure attributed to the existence of an essential facility.9 7
Despite not being a solution to the market structure, essential facility is pursued
to keep or create competition through the forced contractual instruments.9 8 So,
the competition principle prevails over the contractual freedom principle.
According to the FLEC, in order to determine the existence of an essential
input, the FECC should consider:
i. If the essential input is controlled by one or more economic agents
holding market power or they have been declared as "preponderant" economic agents by the FTI;
ii. If its reproduction by another economic agent is not viable from a
technical, legal or economic viewpoint;
iii. If the input is indispensable to the provision of goods or services in
one or more markets, and has no close substitutes;
iv. The circumstances under which the economic agent came to control
the input; and
v. Other criteria, if any, established in the FECC Regulatory Provisions.
The first thing that stands out is that the declaration of essential input implies
an ex ante market power determination. This and the other characteristics reveal
a clear influence of the European jurisprudence rather than the American one.99
94 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 60, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).

95 See Ginebra-Serrabou and Castrillon, supra note I1, at 68 - 70.
96 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Fractions XII - XIII,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).

97 See Ginebra-Serrabou and Castrillon, supra note I1, at 68 - 70.
98 Id.

99 Though the essential facility doctrine originated in American jurisprudence, it has not been
firmed by the U.S. Supreme Court and its scope is far from having been definitely set. Maybe, the
important U.S. Supreme Court case is Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko,
U.S. 398 (2004)], where the Court rejected the doctrine as established Law and refused to invoke
long as there is specific regulation providing the proper remedy, normally access.
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In Europe, the essential facility doctrine has been invoked since the 90s by the
European Commission ).100 There are 4 leading cases worthy to be reviewed as
they have been inspirational for the Mexican lawmaker.
In Magill,'0 1 the European Court of Justice (hereinafter "ECJ") ruled that
under exceptional circumstances it should be given access to goods/services even
though they are protected by intellectual property rights. 10 2 This would occur
when a refusal to deal is accompanied by 3 factors decreasing competition: (a)
the firm reserves to itself a secondary market excluding any potential competition; (b) the firm precludes the emergence of a new product for which there is
demand in the market; and (c) the firm refuses to deal without objective
justification.1 0 3
In Oscar Bronner,10 4 the ECJ added that the exceptional circumstances required in Magill mean: (a) the refusal to deal is likely to eliminate all competition
in the relevant market (in which participates the firm requiring access) and (b)
the facility is essential for the business inasmuch as there is no actual or potential
substitute and there is no substitute. Having no substitute means that i) there is no
plausible alternative to the facility, including a poor quality alternative, and ii)
the inability to duplicate the facility is objective, and is due to technical, economic or legal obstacles, not to the limited capabilities of the competitor requiring access. 0 5
In IMS Health,106 the ECJ confirmed the standard used in the Magill Oscar
and Bronner rulings that a refusal to deal is abusive inasmuch as the essential
facility controlled by the dominant firm is indispensable for competitors to have
effective access to the market.
In European Night Services 0 7 the European Court of FirstInstance held two
important points: (i) the doctrine cannot be invoked by a company that has a
strong presence in the relevant market and it is just trying to strengthen it, and (ii)
the doctrine cannot be enforced against a company that does not have a dominant
position in the relevant market.
C.

Proceeding and Regulatory Remedies

According to the FLEC, 08 the proceeding to determine the existence of "barriers to competition" and essential facility has regulatory purposes whose impor100 Calvo Alfonso-Luis, et al. La Doctrina de las Infraestructuras Esenciales en Derecho Antitrust
Europeo. Madrid, 2012.
101 Case C-241 & 242/91 P, Radio Telefis Erieann v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743.
102 Id.
103 See Alfonso-Luis, et al. supra note 100.
104 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner Gmbh & Co. v. Mediaprint Zeinungs-und Zeitscrhiftenverlag Gmbh
& Co., 1998 E.C.R. 1-779.
105 Id.
106 Case C-418/01, IMS Health v. NDC Health, 2004 E.C.R. 1-05039.
107 Accumulated cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384-94 & T-388/94 [1998] ECR-ll-3141.
108 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 94, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
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tance is hard to ignore due to its implications over the markets. This regulatory
proceeding seems to be a key turning point of a Mexican "devotion," apparent
over the last three decades, to deregulation and acclamation of the minimal government intervention in markets.
The proceeding is initiated ex officio or by the request of the President of the
Republic if there are elements suggesting a lack of effective competition in a
market.1 09 In concluding the investigation, the IA shall propose to the Plenum: (i)
a preliminary decision containing proposals of corrective actions to remove restrictions to the efficient functioning of the market under investigation or (ii) the
closure of the case.' 10
After the preliminary ruling, the IA must notify the economic agents who may
be affected by regulatory remedies likely to be issued with the final decision.III
According to the FLEC, only economic agents with legal interest, a highly restricted procedural standing, may make statements, present memorials and evidence, and if appropriate, also propose suitable and economically feasible
measures to eliminate the identified competition concerns. 112
Notwithstanding, its our opinion, economic agents operating in related markets
and consumer associations are excluded from participating in the proceeding,
despite having legitimate interest in the proceeding, because they can also be
affected indirectly by the regulatory measures imposed by the FECC. It is worth
mentioning that Mexican courts have ruled that there is a constitutional right to
participate in markets where there is effective competition, which is applicable to
both firms and consumers.' 13 Additionally, the legitimate interest, a less restricted procedural standing, whether individual or collective, is also protected by
the Constitution; indeed, in constitutional litigation ("writ of amparo") and other
administrative proceedings the legitimate interest is fully recognized as procedural standing." 4
The final decision is adopted by the Plenum, and might contain the following
remedies:
(a) Recommendations for public authorities when there is regulation restricting competition;
(b) Regarding "barriers to competition," an order to economic agents to
remove a barrier that unduly restricts the competition process;
109 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 68 Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
110 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 68 - 85, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).

I"'

Id.

Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law],], Article 94, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
113 See Ginebra-Serrabou and Castrillon, supra note 11, at 116 - 118.
112

114 Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], Article 103 - 107, as amended,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
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(c) Regarding essential inputs, the determination of essential input and
the issuance of regulation on access mode, prices or rates, technical and
quality conditions, and the implementation schedule; or
(d) Divestiture of assets, rights, shares, or company parts in the necessary
proportions to eliminate anticompetitive effects. This is done only when
corrective measures are not sufficient to solve the competition concerns,
and is not a sanction.'' 5
Implied authorities and economic agents must be notified of the final decision.11 6 In this part, the FLEC alludes to the affected economic agents without
making reference to the procedural standing, legal interest or legitimate interest,
and it leads to reinforce the point made ??earlier about the need to notify economic agents participating in related markets and consumer associations that may
be indirectly affected by the final decision. "7 This is done indirectly because the
remedies are not directly addressed to them, but they are related by circumstances of fact or law with those economic agents directly affected.
The FLEC provides that the economic agents might request the review of the
final ruling through new investigation when they consider the conditions no
longer exist for the setting of "barriers to competition" or an essential facility.' 18
We shall recall that in the case of an essential facility, whether it is determined
through this regulatory proceeding or as a result of a RMP case, necessarily implies the ex-ante market power determination.
VI.

Merger Review

Regarding mergers likely to reduce competition, called "unlawful mergers,"
the FLEC provides that the competition authority "shall not authorize and, if the
event, shall punish the mergers whose purpose or effect is lessen, harm or impair
the competition and free concurrence regarding equal, similar or substantially
related goods or services."'19
The former competition Law obliged economic agents to notify mergers to
the former Federal Competition Commission who should "challenge and punish"
or undue said mergers.1 20 Under the new FLEC, the mergers should be "approved"'21 by the competition authority, which is more precise wording.
115 Ley
Oficial de
116 Ley
Oficial de

Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 85, Diario
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 79, Diario
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).

117 Id.
118 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 96 - 97, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).

119 Ley
Oficial de
120 Ley
Oficial de

Federal de Competencia Econ6mica
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de
Federal de Competencia Econ6mica
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de

[LFCE] [Federal Antritrust Law], Article 61 - 62, Diario
2014 (Mex.).
[LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 16 - 22, Diario
2014 (Mex.).

121 Id.
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According to the FLEC,1 22 when considering if the merger is unlawful, the FECC
should note if the merger or intent of a merger:
i. Confers or is likely to confer to the merging party, acquiring company
or the resulting economic agent, market power in the terms of the Law, or
increases or is likely to increase such market power, in order to obstruct,
lessen, harm or impede competition;1 23
ii. Has or may have the purpose to establish barriers to entry, impede to
others the access to the relevant market, related markets or essential inputs, or displace other economic agents;1 24 or
iii. Has or may have the effect to substantially facilitate to the merger
participants the performing of monopolistic practices as defined in the
Law.
With regard to the above, first, the increase of market power is a new element
aimed to eradicate an old legal use. In the past, an argument of attorneys representing merging parties was that only the emergence of market power resulting
from the merger was considered by the Law, and not the increase of an existing
market power, as an inkling that the merger might reduce competition.1 25
Second, it is a shame that the potential coordinated effects of the merger have
not been included in the relevant provision. The rationale of coordinated effects
argument in order to block or condition a merger is to prevent horizontal mergers
reducing the quantity of firms in the market facilitating future cartels. Under this
argument, commonly used in other jurisdictions, it would have prevented or conditioned mergers as Cinemex/Cinemark-Exhibition of films (CNT-010-2013,
RA-029-2013), a FECC's decision that allowed the concentration of approximately 95% of exhibition market (nationally considered) Such a concentration
substantially facilitates future coordinated conducts (implicit or explicit).
Third, on one hand, the reference to prevent access to related markets is very
positive, as it was not mentioned under the former Law and it was source of
discussion about legal certainty. On the other hand, the reference to "barriers to
competition" will be cause of interpretation problems due to the dangerous
broadness of the concept, as discussed above. The reference to essential inputs is
a very positive inclusion inasmuch as it coincides with the essential facilities
institutions: (i) the RMP and (ii) the regulatory proceeding to the determination
of essential input.
Additionally, according to the FLEC, when the FECC considers there are potential risks to competition process, it must notify the merging parties at least 10
122 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 64, Diario
Oficial de la Federacidn [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
123 The increase of market power is a new element with respect the former Competition Law.
124 Related markets, barriers to entry and essential inputs are also new elements with respect the
former Competition Law.
125 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 86 - 92, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
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days before the case is brought into the consideration of the Plenum.1 2 6 Thus the
merging parties can propose remedies or conditions to correct the risks and competition concerns. The remedies or conditions 27 the FECC can impose or accept,
might consist of:
1. Performing an action or refrain from doing so;
2. Divesting certain assets, rights, shares or company parts;
3. Modifying or eliminating certain terms and conditions from the projected operations;
4. Performing actions aimed to encourage the participation of competitors in the market, as well as give access or sell goods and services to
them; or
5. Other remedies to prevent damages to competition as result of the
merger.
VII.

Proceedings

Although there are several changes dealing with proceedings in comparison to
the former Law, we will only stress out the most important parts.
Investigation Proceeding'

A.

28

Any person can file a complaint or report an AMP, a RMP, or an unlawful
merger to the IA.1 29 The complaints filed by the President of the Republic and by
the Federal Consumer Attorney shall receive preferential treatment.1 3 0
Unlike the former Law, the FLEC eliminates the FECC's duty of publishing
the beginning of investigation notice in the OGF.131 During the investigation, the
FECC has the power to request information to any person including authorities.1 3 2 In doing so, the FECC should explicitly specify if the required person is
the complained party or only an assistant/informant of the IA.1 3 3
126 Ley
Oficial de
127 Ley
Oficial de
128 Ley
Oficial de
129 Ley
Oficial de
130

Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 86 - 92, Diario
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 91, Diario
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 66 - 79, Diario
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 66 - 70, Diario
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).

Id.

131 Ley
Oficial de
132 Ley
Oficial de

Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 30 - 31, Diario
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 119, Diario
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).

133 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 66 - 82, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
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B.

Adversarial Proceeding1 34

As noted above, the redesign of the proceeding turns it into an adversarial
proceeding. It implies that the parties to the proceeding are: the IA as complainant on one side, and the respondent on the other. The respondent can be one or
several economic agents. Both parties litigate the case before the Plenum.
The petitioners, firms or persons reporting the monopolistic practices or unlawful mergers, have only the character of assistant/informants of the Al.1 3 5 They
are not parties to the proceeding.
C.

Proceedings to Challenge the FECC's Decisions

According to the constitutional amendment, the FECC's decisions might only
be challenged through the writ of amparo before the Federal Courts specializing
in Competition and Telecommunications. 13 6 In compliance with that provision,
the FLEC eliminated the former proceeding of appeal existing under the force of
the former Law.
D.

Proceeding to Enforce the FECC's Decisions1 3 7

Under the former Law, in the matter of monopolistic practices and unlawful
mergers, the verification of the authority decisions was not adequately regulated
since the authority had to resort to the Federal Civil ProceduresCode in order to
implement the verification of its decisions. Thus, this new proceeding provided
by the FLEC is very positive. 3 8
The proceeding can be initiated ex officio or by the request of any person
having legal interest, a very restricted procedural standing. 1 39 The Plenum shall
decide in a term up to 20 days once the case file has been integrated. 140
It is important to highlight once more that it is a shame that only persons
having legal interest can request the initiation of this proceeding. This is due to
the same reasoning made above about the legitimate interest as a less restricted
legal standing for consumers and economic agents participating in related markets inasmuch as they might also be affected by the decision.1 4 1
134 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 81 - 85, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
135 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 80 - 82, Diario
Oficial de la Federacidn [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
136 Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], Article 28, 103, and 107, as
amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
137 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 132 - 133,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
138 Id.
139 Id.

140 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 78 -82, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
141 Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], Article 103 and 107, as amended,
Diario Oficial de la Federacion [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.); Ley Federal de Competencia
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VIII.

Commitment Decisions, Leniency and Reduction of Fines

On the matter of RMPs and unlawful mergers1 4 2 , the respondent can present
its proposed commitments only up to the time that the IA issues the OPR. The
respondent must accept in writing the benefit of reduction of fines by proving: (i)
its commitment to suspend, finish or correct the practice or merger in order to
restore the competition process and (ii) the proposed measures are legally and
economically viable and suitable in order to stop the effects of the RMP or
merger under investigation, noting the terms to its compliance.1 4 3
Despite seeming that the respondents must accept the administrative liability
as established by the FECC's decision, such an issue is not clear at all. The
FLEC does not clearly provide that the decision emitted by the FECC should
contain the declaration on the respondents' liability.
This was very clear in Telcel (referred to above). In that case, the former Federal Competition Commission accepted the commitments proposed by Telcel during the appeal,1 4 4 and such authority did not require the acceptance of liability
inasmuch as the commitments were supposedly beneficial for competition and
consumers.
The ideal design would have been that the proposal of commitments by the
respondents might be examined and possibly accepted by the FECC, even during
the adversarial stage, meaning up to the time the case was listed for the Plenum's
decision.
On the other hand, the cases ending without liability declaration over the respondent would impair people willing to claim antitrust damages before the civil
Courts inasmuch as the FederalCivil Procedures Code (for class actions) and the
article 134 of the FLEC (for individual claims) requires a previous FECC's decision on the respondent's antitrust liability.
Regarding the leniency mechanism for reduction of fines,1 4 5 there are not substantial changes in respect to the former competition Law. This mechanism is
devoted to deactivate cartels or AMPs. And, the earlier the cartelist reveals to the
FECC the existence of the cartel, the greater the fine reduction.1 4 6
It is important to stress that in the cases of the revealed cartels to the FEEC,
this procedure is clear that the respondent's administrative liability will always
Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 66 - 70, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de
Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
.142 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 100, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
143 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 100 - 103,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
1

The original decision ruled an administrative liability of Telcel and a fine USD 1,000 million.

145 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 102, Diario

Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
146 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 100, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
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be established by the Plenum's decision, so the procedure on civil liability before
civil Courts is more likely to be initiated by the affected people.1 47
IX.

Sanctionsl48

It is worthy to note the new sanctions provided by the FLECl 4 9 :
* Measures aimed to regulate the access to essential inputs controlled by one
or more economic agents, in the case of a RMP related to an essential
facility);
* Fines up to 5% of the economic agent's income for not reporting a merger;
* Fines up to 10% of the economic agent's income for non-compliance of the
conditions imposed to the merger, without prejudice the divestiture;
* Ineligibility to act as board member, manager, officer, director or representative of a legal entity up to a period of 5 years and a fine up to 200,000
times the minimum daily wage in Mexico City (approximately I million
dollar) to whomever participates directly or indirectly in the performance of
monopolistic practices or unlawful mergers as representatives or on behalf
of legal entities;
* Fines up to 8% of the economic agent's income for non-compliance of: (i)
the commitment decisions, (ii) the order of stop the practice or unlawful
merger or (iii) the order of divestiture;
* Fines up to 18,000 times the minimum daily wage in Mexico City (approximately 90,000 dollars) to public notaries intervening in not authorized mergers by the FECC;
* Fines up to 10% of the economic agent's income to the firm controlling an
essential input for non-compliance of the regulation regarding the input or
non-compliance of the order to eliminate a barrier to competition; and
* Fines up to 10% of the economic agent's income for non-compliance of an
interim measure.
X.

Legal Term to Initiate Investigations

'

Unlike under the former Law, the FECC can now initiate investigations even
after 10 years the anticompetitive practices or unlawful mergers had being performed.' 5 0 Under the force of the former Law, the period was 5 years. t 5
147 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 100-103, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
148 The fines for monopolistic practices remain the same: 10% of the economic agents' income in the
case of AMPs (cartels), and 8% in the case of RMPs (vertical restraints) and unlawful mergers.
149 Ley
VI - XV,
150 Ley
Oficial de
15' Id.

Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 127, Fractions
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 137, Diario
la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
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XI.

Civil Liability for Antitrust Damages

As provided before, the claim for antitrust damages is a matter that comes
under the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. However, both the Federal Civil Procedures Code and the FLEC1 5 2 provides that in order to file a formal complaint for
damages it is essential that a FECC decision previously declares the existence of
a monopolistic practice or an unlawful merger (in res judicata).15 3
The FECC's decision shall prove the unlawful conduct as required by Civil
Law in order to claim damages. 15 4 The complainant in the civil procedure must
prove before the Court the existence of a cause-effect link between the unlawful
conduct and the harm.' 5 5
Article 134 of the FLEC also provides that the antitrust damages shall be litigated before the Federal Courts specializing in Antitrust and Telecommunications. 156 There is a problem with that provision because the Constitution clearly
provides for jurisdiction by the Federal Courts only in the case of class actions. 157 Thus, as long as the Constitution does not provide the civil liability as a
matter under the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts but a matter under the jurisdiction of the State Courts, the individual claims for antitrust damages must be litigated before the State Courts at least until the Supreme Court of Justice or the
Federal Collegiate Circuit Courts provides otherwise.
XII.

Criminal Liability

According to the articles 254 and 254 bis I of the Federal Criminal Code,
there is criminal liability for those who: (i) participate in an AMP (cartel) and (ii)
obstruct the investigation procedure of the FECC or alter or destroy information.
XIII.

Final Comments

The FLEC introduces to Mexican Law several new antitrust institutions on
which both the authority and practitioners have little experience. The work of the
specialized courts and the experience of national and foreign scholars and practitioners will be essential to the process of enriching the scope of such concepts
and its application.
There is also a very important pending task. Mexico must develop an adequate
system to claim antitrust damages, an essential part of the antitrust enforcement
that has proven to be very effective in many jurisdictions.
152 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 134, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
153 Id.
154 Id.

155 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 134, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
156 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica [LFCE] [Federal Antitrust Law], Article 134, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 24 de Julio de 2014 (Mex.).
157 Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], Article 16, as amended, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
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